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THE CONSTITUTION AS A CONTINUING
PRINCIPLE IN GOVERNMENT

College of William and Mary in Virginia,
November 21,1935
ETHELBERT WARFIELD

Names and events, which are only the literary
and historical companions of most Americans and to
all too many mere vague spectres of things once learned
in school, are to you in this place haunted with memories of three hundred years, living people and stirring
drama. American history lives here as it cannot hope
to live in more than one or two favored spots. While
other people speak vaguely of the American Revolution and our great Civil War, to you these events have
almost their original freshness, and the Indian wars
and Bacon's Rebellion are better known to you than
are anything except the names of Yorktown and Peters-:burg to the·great mass of American people wrapped up
in the limited but furious pace of modern life.
It would seem a simple thing for me to convince
you to whom Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson
are fellow townsmen, who see each day your hall de- ·
signed by Christopher Wren, and the beautiful, reconconstructed capital of Colonial Virginia, that all that
comes from that era of change and revolution must be
accepted by all good Americans as their rule of life
and as the one loyalty to which they could not be false.
But to talk in such a way would be to insult your intelligence and to fail to .appraise the true value of historical approach to any subject. We cannot accept
as good that which we ~ould lik~...to think is good for
our own ease of mind. ~e ql.iln~t say that because a
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thing is old it is good; that even because it has survived it is good. In fact, Shakespeare can make Mark
Anthony say without fear of contradiction:
"The evil men do lives after them,
The good is oft interred with their bones."
Rather with the wealth of historical knowledge
which is your heritage, it makes it impossible for me
to speak of the value of that which is old without distinguishing the good from the bad, and you must have
presented to you reasons free from passion and able to
withstand not only the arguments which are uppermost
~
in men's minds today, but all those which have suc- .,
cessfully torn away the pet theories of sincere patriots
and demagogs who have sought to impose their theories
of government upon free people.
If the Constitution of the United States is only
good because it was adopted in a difficult period of our
country by great men tempered by years of political
oppression and war, then its place is in the lecture room
and in the library of the historian and the philosopher.
The greatness of its authors and the patriotism that
made it possible for them to labor through the arduous
days of the Convention will not justify us in upholding
it as the fundamental law of the land in this year
nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
Only to the extent that it meets the needs of the
people in these times can we maintain it as the "first
law of the land".
Chief Justice Marshall said:
"We must never forget that it is a
Constitution we are expounding * * * a
Constitution intended to endure for ages
to come, and consequently, to be adapted
to various crises of human affairs."
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As we can defend only its application to the problems of the world in which we live, so also there is but
one defense against any proposed amendment advocated by the majority of the people, and that of course
is that the amendment does not fit the needs of a free
people under conditions existing in the world in which
we live. Whatever the greatness of the document may
be, however much we are indebted to the drafters
for the solution of the problem of two governments
operating together with clearly defined powers, however much we may believe that the creation of a federal judiciary operating as a check on the legislative
and executive branches is the sublimest achievement
of free government, still no clause of the Constitution
is more important than the provision for amendment
of it. The Constitution was given by the people and
the people may take it back. The life of the Constitution is the will of the people that it be maintained.
To destroy the people's right to amend it as they please
is to destroy the whole reason for a written constitution.
The political partisan and the demagog have no
interest in studying the Constitution except to find in
it language which can be turned to the arguments of
the moment. This is good, or that is bad, but they
would not have you read too closely, for to do so might
wreck their arguments and drive them from the public
stage. For our purposes, however, the more we know
of the Constitution the better able will we be to answer
the real question before us. Shall it continue to be
the law by which we are willing to be governed?
That the Constitution is a great document no one
will deny. Whatever form of government we may believe in, the time has long since passed when any think- .
ing man would care to put himself in the foolish position
of suggesting that the Constitution was inherently
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devoid of greatness. But the Constitution as drawn
in 1793 and the Constitution as it exists today is not
free from flaws. When the Constitutional Convention
convened there were present in it delegates of widely
differing personalities, many of them not only opposed
to the delegates of other states, but bitterly hostile
to the other delegates from their own states. Many
of them came to the Convention with fixed ideas which
they had publicly stated they would not recede from.
Of course there were those with personal political ambitions, and those who were not fitted to grapple with
the great problem that was presented to the Convention. Sectional jealousies and personal hatreds influenced the Convention almost from the first day.
Several of the ablest men in the Convention refused
to put their names to the completed document and
fought the adoption of the Constitution in their home
states. Provisions were written into the Constitution
which have been the cause of political debate and civil
war. Local demands in outstanding cases forced compromises which have not resulted in good to the country.
On the other hand, other compromises infused into the
instrument the life which makes it today the oldest
written constitution still in force. When the document finally was presented to the country by the Convention it was not only its enemies who believed that
there was little chance of its solving the many problems that beset the nation still in its swaddling clothes.
Some of its best friends wondered whether the work
they had done would even bridge the gap between the
chaos of the weak confederation and some future plan
that would justify the years of war and anguish
through which the country had passed.
Among the provisions that were inserted into the
Constitution because of the fear by one group that
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another group would dominate it, was the prOV1SlOn
that upon the election of the president, the individual
receiving the next largest number of votes should be
vice-president. This provision was dictated by the
fear of certain of the small states that the large states
would band together to elect the president, and that if
the president and vice-president were elected separately
the small states would have no word in the government. The fallacy of this reasoning is now history,
and those who insisted upon it were blind to the chaos
that might have been caused in the country by the
jealousy of a vice-president who received his office
only because he was defeated by the president. It is
safe to say that no other element in the Constitution
was more calculated to cause internal dissension than
this. It is a tribute to the common sense of the nation
that this provision was so quickly amended. The
whole history of the provision of the Constitution in
regard to slavery indicates how definitely the drafters
were subject to the same trials and tribulations which
beset any group, however patriotic, in attempting to
"form a more perfect union".
Just as the Constitution itself was not all good or
all bad, so the amendments which have been written
into the Constitution have in some cases helped the
country to prosper, and in some cases have definitely
been a hindrance. The first ten amendments, constituting what is generally known as the "Bill of Rights",
were adopted in conformity with a promise that if the
Constitution were ratified by the States, these amendments would be promptly included in it. These ten
amendments contain the chart of liberties without
which no free people can hope to remain free. On the
other hand, the amendments adopted at the close of the
Civil War were, more by the effect of their enforce-
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ment than by their actual form, a contributing cause in
retarding the recovery of the South at a time when a
helping hand would have done much to have cured the
scars and bitterness of factional strife.
But if there was much in the Constitution that
might well subject its draftsmen to the criticism that
they were not wholly and completely honest in their
determination to draft a document free from all sectional conflicts, yet there is in it a great rule of government that has made it possible for this nation to develop from a small group of colonial districts into the
greatest industrial democracy of all times. The Convention when it assembled had little hope other than
that it might be able to patch up the absolutely useless
provisions of the Articles of Confederation. It is
doubtful whether a quorum could have been obtained
if it had been announced beforehand that from this
Convention would come a revolution little less farreaching than that which resulted from the breaking
off from England. Actually, the result of the Convention was to contribute to political civilization a
principle of government new in form, and one which
required that the people who should be governed under
it would be both intelligent enough to understand the
structure of their government and interested enough
in its functions to maintain the duties which were imposed upon them.
De Tocqueville calls it "The most perfect federal
constitution that ever existed", and says that in examining it "one is startled at the variety of information
and the amount of discernment which it presupposes
in the people whom it is meant to govern".
At the time the Constitution was written many of
the people in the Convention, and most European observers, believed that the people could not possibly take

[8]

the responsibilities that were imposed upon them by
the Constitution, and that the result would be that the
power would be seized by an individual who would
drive the country into some form of absolute monarchy.
During the course of the debates there were many delegates who were strongly of the opinion that the rank
and file of the people were not prepared to pass upon
matters affecting the national government. Many
argued that wealth should be the criterion for the exercise of the franchise; others that the lower house, as
was later the case with the Senate, should be elected
by the state legislatures. There were some who believed that the Senate should be appointed for life,
and others that the Senate should be appointed by the
executive. Out of this debate came one of the great
compromises of the Convention which gave the strength
and character to the Constitution which finally caused
even the most strongly dissenting states to accept it.
Following the English tradition, the Constitution
as drawn, both in its finest clauses and in its weakest
points, was the result of a series of compromises.
Madison's great conception of federal and state governments operating on the same individuals at the same
time but each sovereign within its own sphere, was the
cardinal point in the "Virginia Plan" as presented to the
Convention. The second great feature of this Plan
was the provision for a coordinated system of legislative and executive and judicial branches. Due to
the compromise under which the lower house was to be
elected by popular suffrage, and the Senate to be chosen
by the state legislatures, and other concessions made to
various groups, the Virginia Plan developed into a
much more liberal Plan than its creators had imagined
possible. The Constitution as finally adopted did not
follow the Virginia Plan as presented, but it is safe to
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say that had this bold Plan not been presented to the
Convention, the form of government under which we
have been operating for nearly one hundred and fifty
years could not possibly have been adopted by the
Convention.
Under the Constitution the powers of government
are distributed between the legislative, the executive
and the judiciary. In each case the distinguishing
feature of these branches of government is that their
powers are limited powers. In all other forms of government existing prior to our Constitution, one or more
of the branches of government held the supreme power.
To the extent that the Constitution grants powers to
the branches of the government, these powers are subject again to certain general checks. These checks
are made necessary by reason of the fact that under
the Constitution the power that is given, is given for a
definite period of time, so that unless these checks exist
it is possible for one branch or another of the government to obtain complete control and so change the
organic law as to perpetuate itself in power. This is
the great difference between our form of government
and the governments which hold office at the pleasure
of the legislative branch or the people. Under the
English form of government the Prime Minister maintains his power only so long as he has the confidence
of Parliament. Parliament in turn is subject to election from time to time and if the people lose confidence
in the government, they may elect a new Parliament.
If they have confidence in Parliament but not in the
executive, they may send back the same group to
Parliament who have power to overthrow the executive branch by a vote of lack of confidence. Those
who are opposed to our Constitution point to the great
power that is given to the judiciary, and use as an
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illustration the lack of this power in governments such
as France and England. Such an argument is special
pleading and ignores the differences between the two
systems of government. If our president held office
only so long as he was able to hold the confidence of
Congress and were forced to resign upon receiving a
vote of no confidence, then the need of a veto power
over the executive and legislative branches would not
be so important. But under our form of government
the only restraint that is placed upon the combination
of the executive and legislative control is the testing
of the acts of these branches by the Supreme Court.
This arrangement, it is true, has worked out differently
than most of the framers of the Constitution understood that it would, but as we have become a larger and
more complex nation, this single provision of the Constitution has done more to permit the country to keep
up with changing conditions than any other one; in
addition the presentation of the acts of the executive
and legislative branch to the Supreme Court has given
an opportunity for the country to study in a detached
way these acts and thus is provided the healthiest
plan for the operation of a government of widely
differing peoples that is yet known to man.
We have heard a great deal in recent months about
the Constitution being a document of the "horse and
buggy" era, made at a time when the country was
loosely knit, useful only for people knowing nothing of
this complex and industrial civilization in which we live
today. An examination of the facts would, as a matter of fact, point in exactly the opposite direction.
Had the states continued to be loosely knit, had the
jealousies of commercial exchange which were fostered
by the weak government of the confederation not been
in large part eliminated by the railroad and the tele-
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graph, it is almost certain that the federal government
under the Constitution would have had little more
success than its ill-fated predecessor. The opening of
the West and the development of modern conveniences
tended to tie the states closer together, to make more
prominent the problems that were cqmmon and to
place in the background the controversies that had
previously seemed impossible of solution because of
differences so fundamental as to be unyielding. It is
then one of the p'henomena of our development that
many parts of our Constitution fitted the government
as it developed better than its framers believed it could
possibly fit the problems they had set out to solve.
Woodrow Wilson, in his "Constitutional Government", says:
"When the Constitution was framed
there were no railways, there was no
telegraph, there was no telephone. The
Supreme Court has read the power of
Congress to establish post-offices and
post-roads and to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several states to mean that it has jurisdiction over practically every matter connected with intercourse between the
states.
Railways are highways; telegraph and telephone lines are new
,
forms of the post.
"The Constitution was not meant to
hold the Government back to the time
of horses and wagons, the time when postboys carried every communication that
passed from merchant to merchant, when
trade had few long routes within the
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nation and did not venture in bulk beyond neighborhood transactions.
"The United States have clearly
from generation to generation been taking on more and more of the characteristics of a community; more and more
have their economic interests come to
seem common interests; and the courts
have rightly endeavored to make the
Constitution a suitable instrument of the
na tional life, extending to the things that
are now common the rules that it established for similar things that were common at the beginning."
Mr. Wilson continues:
"The real difficulty has been to draw
the line where this process of expansion
and adaptation ceases to be legitimate
and becomes a mere act of will on the
part of the government, served by the
courts. The temptation to overstep the
proper boundaries has been particularly
great in interpreting the meaning of the
words 'commerce among the several
states.'
"Manifestly, in a commercial nation
almost every item of life directly or indirectly affects commerce, and our commerce is almost all of it on the grand
scale. There is a vast deal of buying and
selling, of course, within the boundaries
of each state, but even the buying and
selling which is done within a single
state constitutes III our day but a part
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of that great movement of merchandise
along lines of railway and water course
which runs without limit and without regard to political jurisdiction.
"Sta te commerce seems almost impossible to distinguish from interstate
commerce. It has all corne to seem part
.
of what Congress may unquestionably
regulate, though the makers of the Constitution may never have dreamed of anything like it and the tremendous intere~ts
which it affects. Which part or the compl~x thing may Congress regulate?
"Clearly, any part of the actual
movement of merchandise and persons
from state to state. May it also regulate the conditions under which the merchandise is produced which is presently
to become the subject matter of interstate
commerce? May it regulate the conditions of labor in field and factory? Clearly not, I should say; and I should think
that any thoughtful lawyer who felt
himself at liberty to be frank would agree
with me."

.

This problem which Wilson ra1ses 1S one which
every generation has had before it and which every
generation must answer, and whatever I have said
about the importance of the document fitting the needs
of today, as to this one question of how far we want
government to go, we have in addition to the responsibility of our own period, the responsibility of what
we will pass on to another generation,-for prosperity
achieved, liberty attained, dictatorship withheld, are
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things that are paid for with a great price. If having gained these things we surrender them, we are
placing on later generations not only a government
which may not be to their liking, but are leaving to
them a condition under which they cannot attain their
desires by orderly legislative process, but which will
require them to resort to war and years of loss of
prope'r ty if they care to win back what we will have
squandered.
The great danger of our form of government is
that we will be temporarily influenced by a man of
great mental achievement or personal attraction, and
that we will give to him power which we would never
dream of giving to any other man, and which in the
giving we would expect to give in a limited measure
by restricting it only to the good which we believe
his genius could accomplish. But unfortunately, every
power that has ever been granted to a government has
been used by it, and once the power has been placed
in the hands of government, such power has never
been allowed to lapse. No man who has ever become a
dictator would in his earlier years have himself believed
that he would ever take some of the powers which
were eventually claimed by him to be his God-given
right.
J ames Madison says in "The Federalist":
"The accumulation of all powers
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary in
the same hands, whether of one, a few or
many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."

[ 15 ]

And so, if we approach the question of amending
the Constitution at all to strengthen the federal government, our first concern must be whether in doing
so we are giving powers we will later want to withdraw, and second, whether our form of government
lends itself to successful operation if greater powers are
bestowed on the federal government. My own personal view is that the' Constitution as written contains
in it such elasticity as to permit a fair administration,
not solely interested in its own perpetuation, to administer the duties confided to it, and that to increase
these powers would be to lead us into at least the
temptation of having all of our affairs administered
from Washington without regard for the welfare of
individual localities.
If, on the other hand, it should appear either as
a matter of economics or political opinion, that the
federal government needs strengthening, then we
should weigh the problem as to whether there is not
some way in which in giving additional power to the
federal government, we cannot also impose additional
checks on the executive and legislative branches.
This is a phase of the question that those who seek
federal control shy away from because they believe
that a fundamental change in our form of government,
with some such arrangement as the British, would not
be popular. They know that the history of the French
government has been particularly unsatisfactory because of the constant changes of ministry. They also
know that the people have before them the recent experiences of germany and Italy under which a dictator
was able to use forms of parliamentary procedure to
seize power under circumstances which are impossible
under our form of government.
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But I submit that the strength of our Constitution
is in the limited powers and the checks set up for those
powers, and we cannot hope to keep the control of our
government in the people if we extend the power of
their rulers. If we are to have two sets of government-which surely have proven themselves of great
efficiency in our period of expansion-we must zealously guard our limited instructions to the government
in Washington. There are many who dismiss the
writings of John Fiske on the ground that he himself
is out of date. But he did not have before him the
experiences of Germany and Italy when he wrote:

"If the day should ever arrive (which
God forbid!) when the people of the different parts of our country shall allow
their local affairs to be administered by
prefects sent from Washington, and when
the self-government of the states shall
have been so far lost as that of the departments of France, or even so far as
that of the counties of England,-on that
day the progressive political career of the
American people will have come to an
end, and the hopes that have been built
upon it for the future happiness and
prosperity of mankind will be wrecked
forever."
If we are to consider changes in our form of government, we must make up our minds what general
ideal we are reaching for. Certainly we are not so
shallow in our reasoning, so irresponsible as to destroy the heritage paid for at such great price-to
throw over the system under which we have gone so
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far without knowing what we will have when it is
gone.
Our Constitution created a new approach to an old
subject, but it did not establish a new system of government.
Former Governor Lowden has recently said:
"The Communist and the Fascist
type of government have this in common, that they both depend upon unlimited power in the head of the State.
It was against this kind of government
the Declaration of Independence was
aimed. They called it then the monarchial principle. In eifect, it did not differ from the present Soviet regime in
Russia, the Fascist rule in Italy or the
Nazi government in Germany.
"There are only two forms of govment, the democratic and the autocratic.
No new nomenclature, no new juggling
of words, can disguise this fact."
I for one cannot and do not believe the American
people will champion any form of government not
based on the democratic principle, for I believe with
De Tocqueville that:
"The progress of democracy seems irresistible, because it is the most uniform,
most ancient, and the most permanent
tendency which is to be found in history."
John Dewey says:
"Regarded as an idea, democracy is
not an alternative to other principles of
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associa ted life. It is the idea of a community itself."
Representative democracy, as we know it in this
country, has gone through a series of phases. Our
governmental institutions, while molded in part on the
British system, were so new as to make it necessary for
them to develop as new work was given them to perform. So far in our country we have without hesitation rearranged the powers of these agencies as the
needs of the country required. Larg~ly this has been
done in the first instance by the executive or the legislature and approved by the Supreme Court. Where
the people wished it the changes have come through
amendment. There are always those who clamor for
quick change and argue that the provisions for amendment do not allow action to be taken speedily. James
Russell Lowell was once asked whether these provisions did not sometimes defeat the will of the people.
"No," he replied, "never the will of the peopleonly the whim."
Abraham Lincoln once reminded the country that
if speedy change were thought necessary by the proponents of change perhaps it was because the proponents realized that taking time for counsel would
lead to the defeat of the changes they espoused.
I have quoted above Woodrow Wilson's creed of
the manner in which progress has been accomplished
without doing abuse to our form of government or our
national life. Actually, this has been accomplished
so far as the judiciary was concerned without any wellfounded criticism of interference with the forward
movement of the country. If, however, it may ever
be shown that the Supreme Court has for partisan
purposes overstepped its duties or subjected itself to
unconstitutional aims of the executive, then de-
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mocracy, as we know it, will require a change in our
form of government if democracy is to continue. If
a change is not made we will have begun the transition
away from democracy. In the various phases of our
country there have been conflicting ideas between various forms of democracy. What is generally known
as a political democracy-that is, a democracy of
form in the election of officers, whether or not these
officers operate to maintain a democratic government-has often been in conflict with what is known
as a social democracy-that is, the application of
democratic principles, however the executive is chosen.
There will always be those who believe that social
democracy is being destroyed by the observers of
the forms of political democracy, and that changes
must be made to assure to the people true democratic government. We must always be prepared to
meet this criticism, and if the control of the government in one party or group defeats the guarantee of a
democratic government to the people, then correction
must be made in our fundamental rule of government
if such a group or party cannot be eliminated by the
machinery set up in our present Constitution. But has
there ever been a time in our history when for any appreciable time the machinery set up by the Constitution has not been sufficient to guarantee the rights
which we believe are the rights of every free man?
If we were to make changes in our government, would
we want to destroy any of the rights which accrue to
our people under our present form of government?
This is the final test that must be made, whether
the government be that which we now have, or a government based upon the English, French or any other
system. What parts of the rights which we now have
would we want to give up? What ones could we add
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that are not now guaranteed to us? Some of the rights
which have been fought for and which are guaranteed
by the Constitution seem to us now to be so much a
matter of our fundamental right as not to be worthy
of serious consideration. For instance, what politician would dare to suggest giving up the complete
freedom of our courts, and yet, the struggle for a free
court was one of the most important issues up to the
adoption of the Constitution. Certainly we believe
that there are times when the rights of property must
be temporarily made subservient to the rights of individuals, but would we be prepared to give up the rights
which we now hold under the Bill of Rights, which
constitute the first ten amendments to the Constitution? Free press, freedom of speech, peaceable assembly, the right of the states to raise militia, the right
of people to be secure in their persons, homes and
effects, the right to a jury trial in criminal cases, the
right of a person charged with a crime to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation. As we will
contend that these rights cannot be taken away from
us, so we must ask ourselves whether under any other
form of government that we might adopt we could be
assured these same rights. Surely we cannot close our
eyes to the fact that these things are more definitely
assured to us so long as those who rule us are strictly
limited in power and so accountable to the very people
for whom these clauses were inserted in the Constitution, and that our only guarantee that these rights will
not be destroyed is to be found in the control which the
people maintain over their own government. Hand
in hand with these individual rights goes the distinction between federal and state governments. Without destroying the necessary powers to permit the
federal government to exist, we have chosen to limit
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the central power and to leave in smaller local units
the power over the normal affairs of our daily life.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a speech made in March,
1930, has stated this principle of the rights of the states
as ably as anyone in the whole history of our country
when he said:
"On this sure foundation of the protection of the weak against the strong,
stone by stone, our entire edifice of
government has been erected. As the individual is protected from possible op- .
pression by his neighbors, so the smallest political unit, the town, is, in theory
at least, allowed to manage its own affairs, secure from undue interference by
the larger unit of the county, which in
turn is protected from mischievous meddling by the state.
"This is what we call the doctrine of
'home rule,' and the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution is to carry this
great principle into the relations between
the national government and the government of the states.
"Let us remember that from the very
beginning differences in climate, soil conditions, habits and mode of living in
sta tes separated by thousands of miles
rendered it necessary to give the fullest
individual latitude to the individual
states. Remembering that the mining
states of the Rockies, the fertile savannahs of the South, the prairies of the
West and the rocky soil of the New Eng-
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land states created many problems, introduced many factors in each locality
which have no existence in others, it is
obvious that almost every new or old
problem of government must be solved,
if it is to be solved to the satisfaction of
the people of the whole country, by each
state in its own way."
Lecky, the historian, writing in 1896, said:
"To divide and restrict power; to
secure property; to check the appetite
for organic change; to guard individual
liberty against the tyranny of the multitude, as well as against the tyranny of an
individual or a class; to infuse into American political life a spirit of continuity
and of sober and moderate freedom, were
the ends which the great American statesmen set before them, and which they in a
large measure attained."
If the Constitution still accomplishes these things;
if it provides moderate freedom while restricting the
power of our rulers; if in fact the three branches of
the government can find sufficient authority to meet
the needs of the modern world-and be it remembered
that in no case has chaos or even a great crisis resulted
from the limitations imposed-are we prepared to
throw our system out of balance by increasing the
power of those who rule us? Are we now to forget the
warnings of every statesman from Washington and
Jefferson down to our own times, and chance the loss
of all we have won by experimenting with the known
danger involved in entrusting our liberties to a single
individual or group however disinterested they may
appear?
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What is there in any other form of government we
would willingly try that more nearly gives us the
rounded .government we seek?
Reforms come with
no greater speed and are assimilated no more easily in
England, France or Canada than in the United States.
True indeed a dictatorship, if the dictator is benevolent,
can more quickly enforce reform than a democracy,
but what possible assurance, what single precedent
does history give us that a dictatorship will bring good,
let alone only good?
Walter Lippman, in discussing a decision of the
United States Supreme Court, said:
"A constitution which is flexible
enough to enable governments to deal
with a crisis and yet strong enough to
withstand temptation to scrap essential
parts of it in moments of excitement is
likely to weather many storms."
The Constitution of the United States has done
this time and time again. It has done so in the difficult period we have just lived through. It is and so
long as the people are "competent to understand the
structure of their government and their own functions
and duties as ultimately sovereign in it, interested as
valuing those functions, and alive to the responsibility
of those duties", will continue to be a complete and
continuing principle of government for this country.
If then there are those who would revise our form
of government let them first search their hearts and
decide whether they are willing to approach the matter
with as great (but no greater) · devotion to the public
interest as was shown by the Convention which
adopted the present Co·nstitution. Let them consider
whether they are sufficiently single-minded in their
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purpose to go into a new convention agreeing as did the
framers of our Constitution to withhold the debates
from the knowledge of the people not only until the
work was presented to the people but until the people
had accepted or rejected their work. Let them decide whether they can adopt as their principle in approaching their problem the words of Washington delivered at the opening of the Federal Convention:

"It is too probable that no plan we
propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained.
If, to please the people, we offer what we
ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a
standard to which the wise and the honest
can repair; the event is in the hand of
God."
Any changes approached on this basis, if containing
the same percentage of good as the Constitution drafted
in 1793, might well receive the approval of the people.
Unless we are approaching the end of our history as a
free nation no changes originating from any other
background will be acceptable to the great majority
of American citizens as a substitute for the present
Constitution of the United States.

